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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents (hereinafter "Plaintiffs" or "Whiteleys") 
generally concur with the comments made in Appellants' 
(hereinafter "Defendants" or "Seftels") brief under the heading 
Statement of Facts. Howeverf additional facts are presented 
herewith to clarify some of the incomplete statements and 
misconceptions which may be obtained by referring to Defendants 
facts. 
On March 6, 1985 Barbara Whiteley toolf by assignment an 
interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract previously entered 
between Defendants and Randy Call in 1981. (R. at 458.) On 
March 11, 1985 she accepted an offer for the purchase of the 
subject property from Terry and Jo Anne Bowns. (R. at 458.) 
The closing of this transaction was to have been conducted in 
the offices of Associated Title Company at which time the total 
amounts owing to Defendants, plus the underlying obligation, 
were to be paid. (R. at 458-59.) Whiteleys made several 
attempts to obtain the specific amounts owing to Defendants 
under the contract, and amounts owing on the underlying loan, 
by telephone conversations with Defendant Sidney Seftel, with 
Defendants' attorneys, and by a personal meeting with 
Defendants' attorneys. (R. at 459-60.) Defendants and their 
attorneys failed and refused to advise Whiteleys as to the 
amount which Defendants claimed was owing. (R. at 459.) 
Whiteleys were ready, willing and able to pay to Defendants the 
amounts owing, if Whiteleys would have been able to determine 
that amount. (R. at 463-65.) 
On September 19, 1985, Plaintiff John Whiteley, sent a 
letter to Defendants by certified mail advising them that the 
funds to pay the balance due on the property had been placed 
with Beehive Title Company. (R. at 461.) Plaintiffs' tender 
required Defendants to release any and all interests they had 
in the property. (R. at 461-62.) At the time this letter was 
mailed by Plaintiffs, certain monies were held in escrow by 
Beehive Title Company. (R. at 462.) 
Other specific facts pertinent to this Appeal are detailed 
throughout the body of Respondents' brief, and are incorporated 
erein by reference. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1: Plaintiffs' offers to deposit and release funds 
held by third party escrow agents was a sufficient "money 
equivalent" to result in a valid tender. Additionally, 
Plaintiffs' tender was unconditional in that Plaintiffs were 
prepared to perform, in full, if Defendants were willing to 
live up to their contractual obligations. 
Even should this Court determine that Plaintiffs' tender 
was insufficient, the trial court's decision should be upheld 
since the trial court further determined that Defendants' 
conduct excused Plaintiffs from tendering in a form different 
-2-
than that undertaken by Plaintiffs, Since Defendants have not 
contended that this conclusion of the trial court was in error, 
the trial court's decision must stand, 
POINT 2. Sufficient evidence exists on the record to 
support the trial court's findings that the Plaintiffs had 
asked Defendants to specify the amounts owing on or about March 
11, 1985. Moreover, Defendants had previously stipulated as an 
uncontested fact that Plaintiff John Whiteley had contacted 
Defendant Sidney Seftel and informed him Plaintiffs were 
prepared to pay all amounts owing, but that Defendants and 
their attorney refused to provide Plaintiffs with that 
information. 
Sufficient evidence also existed to support the findings 
that Associated Title Company had acted as an escrow agent and 
had advised Defendants that they would be paid. Defendants had 
further stipulated as an uncontested fact that they had been 
contacted by Associated Title Company who inquired about the 
amounts Defendants claimed to be owing under the contract. 
POINT 3. While Plaintiffs were admittedly delinquent in 
their payments as required by the express terms of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, such delinquency had no legal consequence 
until the Defendants strictly complied with one of the three 
remedies prescribed by Paragraph 16 of thq contract, thereby 
informing the Plaintiffs what must be done for the protection 
-3-
of their purchasers' interest. Until such time Whiteleys had 
full contractual rights and, therefore, were not in default of 
the contract. 
POINT 4: Since, as spelled out more fully in Points 1 and 
2, supra, Plaintiffs undeniably tendered payment to Defendants, 
or were excused from such tender by Defendants' conduct, 
Defendants were in breach under the express terms of the 
contract by not fulfilling their contractual obligations, and 
by not conveying title to the Plaintiffs as provided by 
Paragraph 8 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
POINT 5: The Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into 
between the parties requires the defaulting party to pay the 
non-defaulting party's attorney fees incurred in the 
enforcement of the contract, in obtaining possession of the 
property, or in pursuing any remedy provided by the statutes of 
the State of Utah. Since Plaintiffs properly tendered, or said 
tender was excused, and Defendants failed to convey title, 
Plaintiffs were properly awarded attorney's fees. All of 
Plaintiffs' efforts, and the efforts of Plaintiffs' attorneys, 
were directed toward the enforcement of the Plaintiff's rights 
under the contract. Further, the trial judge's ruling was an 
order enforcing the contract. Since the clear evidence 
produced at trial supported this ruling, the award of 
attorney's fees was correct. 
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POINT 6: The trial court's determination that Plaintiffs 
had properly tendered, or were excused therefrom, and the 
finding that Defendants had breached the express terms of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, precluded any possibility of 
Defendants recovering under the claims of their counter-claim. 
Therefore, the trial court properly prohibited Defendants from 
presenting their counter-claim. 
Alternatively, Defendants had rested their case previous 
to their request to present evidence on th^ir counter-claim and 
thereby were precluded from from proceeding further. 
Therefore, the trial court's ruling was correct. 
POINT 7: The trial court's granting of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for a Judgment Vesting Title in Lieu of Conveyance was correct 
for two reasons. First, the injunction previously entered by 
the trial court on October 15, 1985, which prohibited 
Defendants from forfeiting Plaintiffs' interest, was still in 
effect pending the final adjudication of this appeal, or a 
termination of the period for appeal. Therefore, the 
injunction remained in effect after the tr^al and prohibited 
Defendants from forfeiting under the terms of the contract. 
Second, the express terms of Paragraph 16 of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract prohibited the Defendants from declaring a 
forfeiture until such time as a payment by the Plaintiffs was 
thirty days past due. Since the trial court ordered Plaintiffs 
to make payments by September 11, 1986, by the express terms of 
-5-
the contract, Defendants could not declare a forfeiture until 
thirty days after said date. Defendants' purported notice of 
default was delivered before the expiration of this thirty day 
period, and therefore was invalid, since Plaintiffs fully 
performed before the expiration of this period, the trial 
court's granting of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Judgment Vesting 
Title in Lieu of Conveyance was correct. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE STATEMENTS MADE BY WHITELEYS, AND BY 
THE TWO TITLE COMPANIES, CONSTITUTED 
SUFFICIENT AND PROPER TENDER. 
ALTERNATIVELY, TENDER IN ANY OTHER FORM 
WAS EXCUSED BECAUSE OF DEFENDANTS' 
CONDUCT. 
The trial court, in its Findings of Facts and Conclusions 
of Law, correctly found that the "declarations and statements 
made by Plaintiff, John Whiteley, and by Associated Title 
Company and Beehive Title Company constituted sufficient and 
proper tender to Defendants of the total amounts then due and 
owing to Defendants under the Uniform Real Estate Contact." 
(Conclusion of Law No. 1; R. at 467.) Defendants maintain 
that this conclusion was error because Plaintiffs never 
produced money or its equivalent, and because Plaintiffs' 
offer was conditioned upon Defendants releasing their interest 
in the property. 
As recognized by Defendants in their brief, at page 11, a 
valid tender does not require an actual production of the 
-6-
money, A tender is sufficient if a money ''equivalent1' is 
offered. zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 
(Utah 1975). Defendants' argument ignores the fact that 
Associated Title Company, as a third party escrow agent, would 
have held funds sufficient to make payment of the amounts due 
to the Defendants under the Uniform Real Estate contract had 
the Defendants, or their agents, simply informed the Whiteleys 
or Associated Title Company of the amounts then owing. 
Additionally, Defendants' argument also ignores the fact that 
Defendants, and/or their agents, were informed in both August 
and September, 1985, that Beehive Title Company had on deposit 
sufficient funds to pay the amounts then owing to the 
Defendants. However, again, Defendants and their agents 
refused to release th£ requested information. (R. at 466.) 
Clearly these amounts held by the escrow adents were 
sufficient to constitute the requisite "equivalent to cash." 
This Court has previously recognized t[hat tender is 
sufficient when a check is left with a banl^ , and the seller is 
informed that the check is available (Hansen v. Christensen, 
545 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1976)) and that the mere telephoning 
with an offer of payment is sufficient to Constitute a tender 
(Romero v. Schmidt, 15 Utah 2d 300, 392 P.2d 37 (Utah 1964)). 
A California court, in facts similar to thd)se in the instant 
case, recently held funds deposited in a b$nk, which was 
prepared to deliver the funds to the escro^ (not even to the 
seller) if requested, was sufficient to constitute "the 
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equivalent of cash" and that the tender was sufficient. 
Hutton v. Gliksberg, 128 Cal. App. 3d 240, 180 Cal. Rptr. 141, 
145 (1982). The amounts held by the title companies as escrow 
agents were patently sufficient to be considered equivalent to 
cash in this case. 
Defendants next contend that Whiteleys' tender was 
insufficient since the tender was conditioned upon Defendants' 
release of their interest in the property. Defendants' 
contention cannot stand. Plaintiffs' tender was unconditional 
in that Plaintiffs were prepared to perform, in full, if 
Defendants were willing to live up to their contractual 
obligations. Escrow closings traditionally require that both 
parties perform concurrently as a protection for both buyer 
and seller. Therefore, it is unreasonable to conclude that 
Plaintiffs' tender was insufficient because the general rules 
of escrow closing required the Defendants to perform as 
required by their contract. 
The above general principle was supported and recognized 
in this Court's decision of Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 
1152 (Utah 1976). In Hansen, the Plaintiff went to 
Defendant's home and offered full payment, which Defendant 
refused. The Plaintiff then left a check for the full amount 
with the bank, and the Defendant received notice that the 
money was available, "in exchange for a deed." ^d. at 1153. 
Despite the fact that, as in this case, the tender required 
the Defendant to produce a deed at the same time as receiving 
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payment, the Court held that the actions ofj the Plaintiff 
constituted sufficient tender. I_d. at 1154|. 
Defendants' reliance on the Utah Supre|me Court's decision 
of Beckstead v. Smith, 656 P.2d 1003 (Utah Il982), is 
misplaced. In Beckstead, the purchaser had stipulated that no 
valid tender had been made. The only issue for the court to 
decide was whether the buyer was excused from tendering 
because of the seller's behavior, j^ d. at 1004. Even were 
this Court to decide that the Beckstead decision was binding, 
the conclusions reached by Defendants are inconsistent with 
the holding in Beckstead. There this Court merely held that 
the seller's performance of conveyance is Conditioned upon, 
and not concurrent with, the buyer's performance of payment. 
Id. at 1004. As stated above, the buyer's performance can be 
by tendering the "equivalent" of payment, Which Whiteleys did 
by setting up an escrow agent and informing Defendants of the 
arrangement. Once Whiteleys validly tendered, they had 
performed sufficiently to require Defendants to perform their 
contractual obligations by releasing the payoff information to 
Plaintiffs. 
Even should this Court determine that Plaintiffs' tender 
was insufficient, the trial court's ruling should not be 
overturned. Defendants do not contend that the trial court's 
Conclusion of Law No. 2 was error. That conclusion of Law, in 
essence, states that Whiteleys were excuse^ from making a 
valid tender because of Defendants' conduct, which frustrated 
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Plaintiffs' attempts to tender. (R. at 467.) Since this 
conclusion was not challenged by Defendants, and since it 
leads to the same result as if Plaintiffs' tender had been 
valid (i.e. Plaintiffs were not in default under the terms of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract, while Defendants were), this 
Court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
POINT 2. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT 
WHITELEYS ASKED DEFENDANTS WHAT WAS 
OWING ON MARCH 11, 1985, AND THAT 
ASSOCIATED TITLE ACTED AS AN ESCROW 
AGENT AND ADVISED DEFENDANTS THAT THEY 
WOULD BE PAID. 
This Court has held that "[t]o mount a successful attack 
on the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must 
marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient 
to support the findings. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985). Scharf further recognizes that this 
requirement puts on the Appellant a "heavy burden." I_d. at 
1070. The arguments made by Defendants in their brief, at 
Argument II, Page 15, simply do not meet this burden. 
Defendants maintain that there is no factual basis for the 
finding that Plaintiff John Whiteley, during a telephone 
conversation on March 11, 1985, requested Defendant Sidney 
Seftel to advise him as to the amount owing under the 
contract. Defendants' claim that Plaintiff John Whiteley 
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testified at trial that he knew how much w^s owing to Western 
Savings and Loan, and to the Defendants, and that therefore 
Plaintiffs were aware of the amounts owing. The portions of 
the trial transcript cited by Defendants irj their brief simply 
do not support their contentions. For example, Plaintiff John 
Whiteley testified: 
Q. So in February you knew tl^ e amount that was 
due to Western Savings and Loan? 
A. Approximately. 
(Transcript of Trial, page 109, lines 2-4; R. at 595.) It goes 
without saying that having an approximate knowledge of the 
amounts owing in February is not the same ^s knowing the 
amounts due in March. 
In the Stipulated Statement of Contested and Uncontested 
Facts, Defendants acknowledge that they had claimed they had an 
equity in the property and did not until April 14, 1986 (more 
than one year after Mr. Whiteley's first iriquiry as to the 
amount claimed to be owing) cause Plaintiffs to be advised that 
they no longer so claimed. (Uncontested F^ct #22 and #32, R. 
at 275 and 279.) Plaintiffs' concern was not only with what 
contract payments were owing, but the tota][ of all amounts 
which Defendants claimed to be due them un4er the contract. 
There was further evidence that Plaintiff John Whiteley 
asked Defendants for information regarding the amounts owing. 
In his previous testimony he told of a telephone conversation 
with Defendant Sidney Seftel in which he informed Mr. Seftel 
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that a buyer had been found, and that he expected to fully pay 
whatever was owing. (Trial Transcript pages 78-80, R. at 562 
to 564.) Mr. Whiteley further testified: 
Q. Did you have any further conversation with him 
[Defendant Sidney Seftel]? 
A. I think that I called him another time a 
little later to tell him the same thing and to find out 
what he claimed was owing. 
Q. Did you make any further attempts to contact 
Mr. Seftel? 
A. I think I made two or three phone calls after 
that and left word for him to call or talked to his wife 
and asked her to have him call. And he didn't return the 
calls. 
(Trial Transcript page 80, lines 14-17, 21 to page 81, line 1; 
R. at 564-65.) 
When John Whiteley was shortly thereafter asked to explain 
the purpose of the phone calls, he responded: 
Q. And the purpose for the phone calls, again, to 
Mr. Seftel? 
A. Was to assure him that we were proceeding with 
this sale and that we needed his figures and that the 
payoff was imminent. 
(Trial Transcript, page 81, lines 13 to 15; R. at 565.) Mr. 
Whiteley further testified that these conversations took place 
around March 11, 1985. (Trial Transcript page 81, lines 21-22; 
-12-
R. at 565.) The above statements patently support the trial 
court's Finding of Fact that Plaintiffs asked Defendants what 
was owing on or about March 11, 1985, and that Defendants 
refused to give this information to them. 
Additionally, Defendants previously stipulated, in the 
Stipulated Statement of Contested and Uncontested Facts, that 
it was an uncontested fact that Plaintiff John Whiteley 
telephoned Defendant Sidney Seftel and informed him that 
Plaintiffs were prepared to pay all amount^ owing (Uncontested 
Fact #19, R. at 274-75), and that Defendants did not advise 
Plaintiffs as to the amounts claimed owing (Uncontested Fact 
#20, R. at 275). Uncontested Fact #20 (R. at 275) goes on to 
reveal that "Plaintiff John Whiteley made additional attempts 
to obtain information regarding the amount claimed by Mr. 
Seftel to be owing under the contract [butjthat] Defendants and 
their attorneys failed and refused to provide Plaintiffs with 
the requested information." These facts, $tipulated to by 
Defendants, further support the trial court's findings. 
The Defendants next contend that there were insufficient 
factual evidence to find that Mr. and Mrs. Bowns were prepared 
to complete the purchase of the property fi;om Plaintiffs and 
would have completed it if Defendants had provided the 
requested information as to the amounts owing. At trial, Mrs. 
Jo Anne Bowns, after testifying that they were prepared to 
purchase the subject property, stated: 
Q. Did you complete the purchase of that property? 
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A. No, we didn't. 
Q. And why not? 
A. The owner couldn't come up with free title on 
it, clear title, I guess that's what you call it. 
(Trial Transcript, pages 22, lines 24-25, page 23, lines 1-3; 
R. at 507-508.) Again, as further clarified in the statements 
by Plaintiff John Whiteley above, the reason Plaintiffs could 
not obtain clear title was because Defendants refused to 
specify the amount that needed to be paid off. 
Defendants further contend that the trial court's findings 
that Associated Title Company was involved in the Bowns' sale 
as a third party escrow agent, which would hold sufficient 
funds to make payment of the amounts owing, was not supported 
by substantial evidence. However, testimony by Blake T. 
Heiner, vice-president and legal council of Associated Title, 
and especially Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, introduced into evidence 
through Mr. Heiner, support the trial court's findings. (See 
Trial Transcript, pages 67 to 74; R. 551-58.) Specifically, 
Exhibit 11 indicates that $53,961.00 was held by Associated 
Title Company at the critical time. Such was clearly 
sufficient to pay the amounts due and owing to Defendants, if 
Respondents or Associated Title would have properly been given 
the requested information. 
Finally, Defendants stipulated as an uncontested fact 
that, in connection with the proposed sale of the property to 
the Bowns, "certain employees at Associated Title Company 
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contacted the Defendants to inquire about the amounts 
Defendants claimed to be owing under the subject contract" 
(Uncontested Fact #25; R. at 276). All of the above 
constitutes substantial support for the trial court's findings. 
POINT 3: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT IN DEFAULT UNDER THE 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. 
Contrary to the conclusion reached by Defendants in 
Argument III of their brief, Plaintiffs were not in default 
under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract such as to 
terminate their rights under the contract. Defendants confuse 
"delinquency" or "default in payment" with a contractual 
default sufficient to preclude further rights under the 
contract. 
Contract payments were due on the 1st day of the month. 
Remedies to enforce payment were available to the contract 
seller only after a payment was more than thirty days 
delinquent. (Uniform Real Estate Contract^ Plaintiffs' Trial 
Exhibit #1.) Payments were made through February, 1985. 
(Stipulated Fact #24, R. at 276.) Mr. Whiteley testified that 
on March 11, 1985 he requested Mr. Seftel tto tell him the 
amounts owing under the contract. The thirty day grace period 
had not yet run as to the payment due March 1st. The requested 
information was not provided and no payments were thereafter 
made until the payment of October 21, 1985. (Stipulated Fact 
#24, R. at 276.) 
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While Plaintiffs were admittedly delinquent or in default 
in their post February, 1985 payments as required by the 
express terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, such 
delinquency had no legal consequence until the Defendants 
strictly complied with one of the three alternative remedies of 
Paragraph 16 of the contract, thus putting the Plaintiffs on 
notice of what remedial measures must be initiated to protect 
their interest. Before that occurred, the Plaintiffs-
purchasers had full contractual rights and, therefore, were not 
in "default" under the contract. 
This Court has held that full contractual rights remain 
pending the contract seller's strict compliance with the 
requirements of Paragraph 16. In Hansen v. Christensen, 545 
P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976), the Court stated that "the contractual 
relations between seller and buyer are in existance until such 
time as the seller chooses to notify the defaulting buyer of 
its election to proceed under one, or all, of its options." 
Id. at 1154. Similarly, the Court stated in a case cited by 
Defendants in their brief, Hadlock v. Showcase Real Estate, 
inc., 680 P.2d 395 (Utah 1984), that the sellers have "no cause 
of action" until the Paragraph 16 requirements have been 
strictly complied with. I_d. at 398. Further, the Court has 
said the "provisions of the Uniform Real Estate Contract are 
not self-executing, and to enforce them, it requires some 
affirmative act on the part of the seller to notify the buyer 
of what specific provision in the contract the seller is 
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proceeding under and state what the buyer must do to bring the 
contract current." Grow v. Marwick Development, inc., 621 P.2d 
1249, 1251-52 (Utah 1980), citations omitted. See also Pomeroy 
on Specific Performance of Contracts (3d Ec^.), §393, p. 836, 
wherein it is said: 
If the clause be not absolute that thd contract shall 
be ipso facto void upon a default in payment at the 
time, that its object in its language is to give the 
vendor his election and power to put an end to the 
agreement upon the vendee's failure in paying at the 
appointed day, then the vendor, if he intends to 
avail himself of the provisions must give the 
purchaser a timely and reasonable notice of his 
intention to avoid the contract, or must do some 
unequivocable act which unmistakably shows that 
intention, for the vendor cannot treat the default 
alone as terminating the agreement"]! (JEmphasis added.) 
The above was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court to be a 
"correct doctrine" in Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P.2d 
699, 703 (1934). 
On August 28, 1985, Defendants mailed to John Whiteley a 
notice (Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit #8) advising of default and 
the election to pursue the forfeiture remedy prescribed by 
Paragraph 16A of the contract. (Stipulate^ Fact #29, R. at 
278.) No previous Paragraph 16 election had been given. By 
this time numerous attempts had been made both by John Whiteley 
at Associated Title Company months earlier to pay off the 
contract balance. Plaintiffs had lost their April 1985 sale to 
Mr. and Mrs. Bown. Additionally during th0 month of August, 
Beehive Thrift had attempted to obtain information from 
Defendants so to pay off the contract balance. (Testimony of 
Grant G. Orton; R. at 527-528.) Finally, defendants filed 
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their counterclaim in this action seeking recovery of damages 
under Paragraph 16B of the contract, rather than the Paragraph 
16A forfeiture remedy elected by their letter of August 28, 
1985. 
Defendants had failed to properly comply with any of the 
provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. Plaintiffs, therefore, were not placed in default 
under the contract. Defendants cite to this Court's ruling in 
Fireman's Insurance Co. v. Brown, 529 P.2d 419 (Utah 1974), for 
support of their contention that each month's failure to pay 
resulted in a default by Plaintiffs. However, a close look at 
the result of that case leads to an opposite conclusion. In 
Fireman's Insurance Co., the Court allowed the buyer to receive 
title to the property even though he was over twenty months 
behind in payments. The seller had improperly given notice to 
the purchaser. She had not strictly complied with the 
requirements of the default provisions of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. Contrary to Defendants' contention, the Court 
merely concluded that it is obvious the purchaser was in 
default of his payments. Id. at 420. This delinquency or 
default in payments did not lead to the result that the 
purchaser was in default under the contract, and had no rights 
thereunder. In the instant case, while Plaintiffs were 
admittedly delinquent or in default of some payments, that 
delinquency was occasioned by the "straight arm" tactics of 
Defendants who had failed to pursue their contract remedies. 
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The Plaintiffs still had full rights under the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract to require Defendants to advise them as to the 
balance they claimed as owing under the contract and to accept 
payment thereof and deliver title to the lqnd subject of the 
contract. 
POINT 4: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANTS HAD BREACHED THEIR CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT. 
Defendants maintain that the trial court incorrectly ruled 
that they were in default under the terms of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. Defendants principal contention is that 
Plaintiffs were obligated to bring all past} payments current 
before Defendants were under any obligation to deliver a deed. 
While Defendants state the correct law, th^y apply the law 
incorrectly to the facts in this case. As supported by the 
facts, and more specifically spelled out iri Points 1 and 2, 
supra, Plaintiffs clearly and undeniably t0ndered and offered 
to pay to Defendants the entire amounts owing under the 
contract, including the delinquent payments that were owing at 
that time. If Defendants or their agents would have merely 
informed Plaintiffs or either title company of the total 
amounts owing, that amount would have been paid to Defendants. 
It is unreasonable to argue that since the delinquent payments 
had not been paid, Defendants could not be in default, 
especially since those amounts were in fact; tendered by 
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Plaintiffs, or at the very least, tender was excused because of 
Defendants' conduct. This Court has accepted the rule that: 
there is implied in any contract a covenant of good 
faith and cooperation, which should prevent either 
party from impeding the others performance of his 
obligations thereunder; and that one party may not 
render it difficult or impossible for the other to 
continue performance and then take advantage of the 
non-performance he has caused, 
Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975) 
(footnotes omitted). 
Additionally, while Defendants initially claimed that they 
had an equity in the subject property (Uncontested Fact #22; R. 
at 275), not until April 14, 1986 did they inform Plaintiffs 
that they were no longer claiming any such equity. 
(Uncontested Fact #32, R. at 279.) As the Defendants were 
themselves unable to accurately and timely identify what amount 
they were claiming under the contract, they could not fault the 
Plaintiffs for not making payment of said amounts. 
The Faulkner cases cited by Defendants in Argument IV of 
their brief are factually distinguishable and are not 
supportive of the contentions raised by Defendants. Faulkner 
v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1983); Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986). In the Faulkner cases, 
the Court limited its discussion to the award of attorney's 
fees, and was not addressing the explicit provisions of the 
contract. Further, the facts of Faulkner reveal that the 
purchaser never tendered payment to the seller, as was done by 
the Plaintiffs in the instant case. 
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POINT 5: THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS AWARD 
OF PLAINTIFFS1 ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Defendants, in their brief, have correctly stated the law 
as being that when parties have agreed by contract to the 
payment of attorney's fees, the court may award fees in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement, Turbo Management, 
Inc. v. Haggas Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utjah 1982), and that a 
party is entitled to those fees attributable to the successful 
vindication of contractual rights within the terms of the 
agreement, Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). 
Additionally, it is generally recognized that the amount of 
attorney's fees to be awarded is within th0 sole discretion of 
the trial court. I^ d. at 858. Contrary to the conclusion 
reached by Defendants, however, and as mor^ fully spelled out 
in Points 3 and 4, supra, the trial court properly concluded 
that Plaintiffs were not in default under tjhe terms of the 
contract and that Defendants' breached the contract by refusing 
to permit payment by Plaintiffs and refusing to deliver to 
Plaintiffs title to the property. Since the above rulings by 
the trial court were patently correct, the Court's award to 
Plaintiffs of attorney's fees as provided in Paragraph 21 of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract was also correct. 
Also contrary to Defendant's conclusions, the trial 
court's award of attorney's fees was made on the basis of 
findings of fact supported by evidence and an appropriate 
conclusion of law. Plaintiffs, and their attorneys, from the 
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beginning made it clear that they were attempting to enforce 
the express provision of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Their efforts have been directed at attempting to enforce the 
express provisions of the contract and to obtain a "successful 
vindication of contractual rights within the terms of [the] 
agreement." Trayner, supra, at 858. Plaintiffs pursued and 
obtained injunctive relief against Defendants precluding any 
forfeiture or foreclosure of the contract pending final 
adjudication of all issues. Finally, they obtained a 
conveyance of the property as required by the terms of the 
contract. 
Additionally, there can be no doubt that the trial court 
judge's ruling was an order enforcing the contract. The trial 
court, as urged by Plaintiffs, looked to Rule 54(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure which specifies that "every final 
judgment shall grant the relief which the party in whose favor 
it is rendered is entitled . . . ." The evidence introduced at 
trial supported the trial judge's ruling. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs' efforts were attributable to the successful 
vindication of Plaintiffs contractual rights and the award was 
correct. 
POINT 6: THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW 
DEFENDANTS TO PRESENT THEIR 
COUNTER-CLAIM WAS NOT ERROR. 
Defendants argue that the trial court committed reversible 
error in refusing to allow presentation of evidence on their 
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counter-claim. The counter-claim sought damages, pursuant to 
Paragraph 16B of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, as well as 
for any amounts realized by Plaintiffs fron| any sale of the 
property. Claim was further made for cost^ and attorney's 
fees. (R. at 70-75.) 
The trial record indicates that at th^ end of Defendants1 
case-in-chief, Defendants' counsel rested t>is case. No 
evidence had been offered or presented as to Defendants' 
attorney's fees. The record reflects the following exchange: 
Mr. Jackson: That's all the questions I have, Your 
Honor. 
Mr. Weston: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
Judge Billings: Thank you very much. We appreciate 
your assistance. 
Mr. Jackson: Can this witness 3q>e excused, Your 
Honor? 
Judge Billings: Yes. 
Mr. Jackson: That's all the testimony I will 
present at this time. 
Judge Billings: The Defendant rests then? 
Mr. Jackson: It rests. 
Mr. Weston: No rebuttal, Your donor. 
Judge Billings: Do you wish to make comments to the 
court, counsel? 
Mr. Weston: Yes, I would like to, if I might, Your 
Honor. 
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Judge Billings: Please proceed, 
(Whereupon, counsel made comments to the court.) 
(Trial Transcript Pages 151-52; R. at 637-38.) The Defendants 
resting of their case resulted in the trial court correctly 
prohibiting Defendants from later presenting evidence to 
support their counter-claim. 
It was not until after closing argument by counsel and 
after the Trial Judge's announcement of her findings and 
decision that there occurred the exchange to which Defendants 
refer in Argument VI of their brief. In other words, 
Defendants did not request an opportunity to present further 
vidence regarding their counter-claim until after they had 
rested, argued their case and received the ruling of the 
court. Clearly, their opportunity was then waived and 
forfeited. In any event, the Court had determined Defendants 
in default under the contract and therefore no award to them of 
damages or attorney's fees was then proper. 
POINT 7: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT 
VESTING TITLE IN LIEU OF CONVEYANCE. 
Defendants contend that the trial court committed 
reversible error in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a Judgment 
Vesting Title in Lieu of Conveyance because, following entry of 
the Judgment, Plaintiffs failed to make payments as ordered by 
the Court and Defendants properly served a Notice of Default 
upon Plaintiffs. Defendants argument must fail for two reasons. 
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First, as recognized in Argument VII 6f Defendants' brief, 
on or about October 15, 1985, the trial court entered an 
injunction enjoining Defenfants from any acption to declare a 
forfeiture or otherwise foreclose on Plaintiffs' property 
interest pending "final adjudication"9 of the case (R. at 
26-27). The Defendants wrongfully conclude, however, that once 
the trial was concluded the injunction was lifted, freeing 
Defendants to pursue the property. 
It is generally agreed that "final adjudication" of a case 
does not occur until all of the appeals process is completed. 
Ellison v. Gray, 702 P.2d 360, 367 (Okla. 1985); Lussy v. Dye, 
695 P.2d 465 (Mont. 1985); Wycoff v. Quickway Homes, Inc., 201 
Kan. 442, 441 P.2d 886 (Kan. 1968); General Motors Corp. v. 
Miller Buick, Inc., 56 Md. App. 374, 467 A.2d 1064 (1983). In 
cases which are not appealed, the adjudication does not become 
final until the termination of the possible period for filing 
of an appeal. Wycoff, supra, 441 P.2d at 890. 
Since the injunction entered on October 15, 1985, remains 
in effect until the outcome of this appeal, Defendants were 
prohibited from proceeding against Plaintiffs' contract 
interest. Since plaintiffs did subsequently comply with the 
requirements of the trial court's order, the trial court's 
granting of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Judgment Vesting Title in 
Lieu of Conveyance was correct. 
Alternatively, while Plaintiffs were unable to procure the 
financing necessary for their payment to Defendants in the 
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amounts ordered to be paid by the trial court by September 11, 
1986, on that date Plaintiffs' attorney, Gary A. Weston, 
notified the court and Defendants' attorney, Daniel w. Jackson, 
that Plaintiffs were as yet unable to obtain the financing 
necessary to make the ordered payment, but that they would be 
able to obtain the financing within the next ten days or two 
weeks. (R. at 392.) Despite Plaintiffs' attorney's telephone 
call, Defendants' attorney caused a letter to be delivered the 
following day to Plaintiffs' attorney demanding payments be 
made as provided under Paragraph 16A of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. (R. at 397-98.) Said letter expressly provided that 
payments must be made within five days of the notice. 
Defendants maintain that since Plaintiffs did not pay within 
the five day period of the notice, Plaintiffs were in default. 
Defendants' argument fails to recognize the specific 
language of Paragraph 16 of the contract. That paragraph 
explicitly provides that no election can be made by the seller 
until a payment becomes thirty days delinquent. (R. at 13.) 
It was unquestionably, the order, as well as the spirit, of the 
Judgment by the trial court that the amounts owing to the 
Defendants by the Plaintiffs under the contract were first due 
and payable on September 11, 1986. Therefore, there could be 
no default relative to payment prior to that date. As a 
result, the Paragraph 16 remedies of the Real Estate Contract 
did not become available to the Defendants until thirty days 
following that date. As a result, the notice intended by the 
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letter of September 12, 1985, was premature. Since Plaintiffs 
subsequently complied with the terms of the trial court's order 
before the expiration of that contractual period, and before 
proper notice was given by Defendants, the trial court 
correctly granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Vesting Title 
in Lieu of Conveyance. 
An additional factor is that Plaintiffs received two 
separate notices from Defendants' counsel within a seven day 
period, each specifying the total amount of the delinquency. 
The amounts were different in the two notices. Plaintiffs 
received, on or about September 19, 1986, a letter and 
"Declaration of Forfeiture" indicating that the amounts in 
delinquency were approximately $200.00 less than the previous 
September 12, 1986, letter and Notice (See R. at 337-405). The 
conflicting notices did not constitute proper compliance with 
Paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs paid all requisite amounts and the 
trial court properly granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment 
Vesting Title in Lieu of Conveyance. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly ruled that Plaintiffs' tender was 
sufficient, that Plaintiffs were not in default under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, that Defendants had breached 
their contractual obligations and that an award of Plaintiffs' 
attorney's fees was proper. Further, it properly refused to 
allow Defendants to present further evidence on their 
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counter-claim, and granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment 
Vesting Title in Lieu of Conveyance, This Court should affirm 
the District Court, dismiss the above-captioned Appeal, and 
award Plaintiffs their costs herein, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. * 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J£> day of June, 1987. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 8 t h day «f JANUARY * .
 D n l» 
by and between STTWFY e;TTTFT. »r*A TurpgA g y r m . , >i»eKan^ *** **f~ 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and RANDY P . CALL, a m a r r i e d man 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of S a l t L a k e C o u n t y , U t a h 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and eonvey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, titaatt la 
the county of S a l t L a k e state of Utah, to-wit: 2*^7 yMt «nqc, grmfh , ST.P, Tff 
AODftcee 
More particularly described as follows: 
Part of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 27, Township 1 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, described as follows: 
Commencing 577.5 feet North and 208.6 feet East of the Southwest corner of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 27, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, and running thence South 236.4 feet; thence East 77 feet; thence 
North 236.4 feet; thence West 77 feet to the place of beginning. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sura of . 
SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND AND N O / I O n r h * T W U ~
 ( ; 6 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order . 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: FIFTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY- # t l 5 . 7 & 7 . 0 0 ) 
cash, the receipt of which n hereby acknowledged, and the balance of f 4 5 , 2 5 3 . 0 0 SEVEN
 l h a ) j u p a i d M io\\owt: 
See EXHIBIT A attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the * 0 t h day «,/ JANUARY
 1Q 81 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of tht 
principal. Interest shall be charged from fflfiSF^STON
 e n ml] unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of 1 0 . 2 5 per cent ( 1 0 « 2 5 ^ ) p«r gnnum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid bsisnee subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the exeess payment is mMdt. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contrsct less thsn secording 
to the term* herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hrrtntAftct stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of. 
WESTERN SAVINGS AND T.OAN COMPANY with an unpaid balance of 
s 45,253.00 (Approximate^gx** 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following NONE 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed ZERO percent 
( QJL%) per annum and psyable in regular monthly Installments; provided that the sgregste monthly installment 
payments required to b« made by Seller on *aid loans shall not be grestcr thsn each installment psyment required to be 
made by the Bu>er under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any sueh 
loans and mortgsges the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept Utle to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding st date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations agsinst said property incurred by seller, after data of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligstions are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of tht Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payment* and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to psy sll taxes and assessments of every kind and nsture which are or which may be assessed 
and which msy become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
SALT LAKE COUNTY SUBURBAN SANITATION DISTRICT 
<UT.T T LYV rniTMTV C/prPTAT TyrgTETPT MQ J 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property. 
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12. The Buyer agrees to pay the fenerml taxea after 
13. The Buyer further acrees to keep all insurable build Inn **d improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or t_ 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at hi* option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer a trees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of aaid sums at the rata of X, of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
aaid premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within THTRTY HCH days thereafter, the 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the nght, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default withm i^t days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at onee a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a aubsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at hi* option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may cleet to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the lawi of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees: and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged properly snd collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement 
18 In the event there are any hens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to. or in the event any lien* or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter acerue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, psy and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equ,al any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warrsnty deed conveying the title to the 
above desenbed premises trtt and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as msy have accrued 
by or through th* acts or negleet of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or.at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20 It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto. 
See EXHIBIT A attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy u pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to applyj£jL£d*^ind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this sjrfeemeht have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
first above written. 
Signed in the presence of 




















TO UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT BETWEEN 
SIDNEY SEFTEL and THERSA SEFTEL, SELLER 
RANDY D. CALL, BUYER 
3. (A) Consecutive monthly payments of Four Hundred Seventy-One Dollars 
($471.00) for principal, interest and taxes, plus Five Dollars 
($5.00) Service Charge with said payments to commence on or before 
February 1, 1981, with successive payments due on or before the 
1st day of each and every month thereafter until principal and 
interest are paid in full. 
(B) Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Forty-Seven Dollars ($10,747.00) cash, 
with no interest, due in a balloon payment on or before April 16, 1981. 
(C) The parties agree to adjust the payments for property taxes annually 
on or before November 30th of each and every year this Contract is in 
effect. 
(D) All parties acknowledge that this loan may or may not be assumable 
and agree as follows: 
1. Buyer agrees to accept full responsibility should the interest 
rate on said loan increase. 
2. Seller agrees to accept full responsibility if the interest 
rate should increase due to any action on his -part. 
(E) The parties agree that Seller shall execute a Warranty Deed on this 
date, conveying said property to Buyer, with said Deed to be held in 
escrow pending satisfaction of the terms of said Agreement. 
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Gary A. Weston (3435) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f s 
1100 B e n e f i c i a l L i fe Tower 
36 South S t a t e S t r e e t 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
HLED IN CLFRK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
AUG 11996 
M D.xor, 
°cm C c ; 3.c D.5t Court 
FILMED L 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN M. WHITELEY, BARBARA 
WHITELEY, and ELAN MANAGEMENT, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL and THERESA 
SEFTEL, 
Defendants . 
STIPULATED STATEMENT OF 
CONTESTED AND UNCONTESTED 
FACTS 
C i v i l No. C85-6571 
P l a i n t i f f s and Defendants , proceed ing by and through 
t h e i r unders igned counse l of r e c o r d , do s t i p u l a t e and agree as 
f o l l o w s . 
UNCONTESTED FACTS 
The f o l l o w i n g f a c t s are u n c o n t e s t e d by P l a i n t i f f s and 
Defendants : 
1 . On or about January 8 , 1 9 8 1 , De fendants , Sidney 
S e f t e l and Theresa S e f t e l , h i s w i f e , e n t e r e d i n t o a Uniform Real 
E s t a t e Contract with Randy D. Cal l ( E x h i b i t A) c o v e r i n g the 
purchase by Mr. Cal l of c e r t a i n r e a l e s t a t e l o c a t e d a t 2337 East 
- 5 - 00268 
3395 South in Sa l t Lake County, S t a t e of Utah f and more 
p a r t i c u l a r l y desc r ibed a s : 
Pa r t of t h e Southwest Quar ter of t h e Southeas t 
Quarter of Sec t ion 27, Township 1 South, Range 
1 Eas t , S a l t Lake Base and Meridian, desc r ibed 
as fo l lows : 
COMMENCING 577.5 f ee t North and 208.6 f e e t East 
of the Southwest corner of the Southeas t 
Quarter of Sect ion 27, Township 1 South, Range 
1 Eas t , Sa l t Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence South 236.4 f e e t ; thence East 77 
f e e t ; thence North 236.4 f e e t ; thence West 77 
f ee t to the p lace of b e g i n n i n g . 
2. At the time of the execu t ion of the s a id Uniform Real 
E s t a t e C o n t r a c t , Defendants executed a Warranty Deed (Exh ib i t B) 
wherein Mr. Cal l was named as g r an t ee of the p rope r ty in q u e s t i o n 
and placed s a i d deed in escrow with Colony T i t l e Company. 
3. At the time Randall Cal l en te red i n t o the Uniform 
Real E s t a t e Cont rac t in q u e s t i o n , he was a c t i n g as an und i sc losed 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of P l a i n t i f f John M. Whiteley who owned p r o p e r t y 
ad jacen t to the p rope r ty in q u e s t i o n . At the time the c o n t r a c t 
was execu ted , Mr. Cal l and P l a i n t i f f s were aware t h a t an 
o b l i g a t i o n of $45,253.00 owing by Sidney and Theresa Se f t e l to 
Western Savings & Loan Company was secured by a t r u s t deed l i e n 
a g a i n s t the p rope r ty in q u e s t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , t h e p a r t i e s 
unders tood and knew t h a t the loan from Western Savings & Loan 
Company conta ined a Due on Sales c l a u s e and was not assumable . 
4. At the time the c o n t r a c t was execu ted , Mr. Cal l paid 
Mr. Se f t e l $5,000.00 cash as down payment and p a r t i a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n for the purchase of the p rope r ty under the terms and 
c o n d i t i o n s of the Uniform Real E s t a t e C o n t r a c t . T h e r e a f t e r , on 
February 1, 1981, Mr. Cal l made the f i r s t monthly payment to 
Defendants in the amount of $471.00 for p r i n c i p a l , i n t e r e s t and 
t a x e s , p lus $5.00 s e r v i c e charge pursuant to the terms of t h e 
Uniform Real E s t a t e C o n t r a c t . 
5. On or about Apr i l 16, 1981, Mr. Cal l paid to Mr. and 
Mrs. Se f t e l the sum of $10,747.00 as a ba l loon payment pursuant to 
the terms of the Uniform Real E s t a t e C o n t r a c t . This payment 
completed the payment of $15,747.00 as provided in paragraph 3 of 
t h e Contrac t and reduced the o u t s t a n d i n g ba lance due under the 
Purchase Agreement to $45 ,253 .00 , l e s s the po r t i on of the monthly 
payments paid for each of t h e months of February, March and Apri l 
as were a t t r i b u t a b l e to a repayment of p r i n c i p a l . This amount was 
then cons idered by the p a r t i e s to be the amount then owing to 
Western Savings & Loan Company on the under ly ing t r u s t deed l o a n . 
6. The $5,000.00 paid by Mr. Cal l a t the time of t h e 
execut ion of the c o n t r a c t p lus the $10,747.00 which he paid on or 
about Apri l 16, 1981, r e p r e s e n t e d the amount of $15,747.00 which 
was the e q u i t y which Mr. and Mrs. Se f t e l had in the p rope r ty a t 
the time of t h e i r c o n t r a c t s a l e . 
7 . After payment of $10 ,747 .00 , Defendants remained as 
record owners of the p roper ty pursuant to the terms of t h e i r 
c o n t r a c t with Mr. Cal l to a t tempt to avoid an i nc r ea se in the 
i n t e r e s t r a t e on the t r u s t deed loan a g a i n s t the p rope r ty or the 
a c c e l e r a t i o n of payment of t h e loan balance^ 
8. Mr. Ca l l r e c e i v e d , but did not record the warranty 
deed (Exhib i t B). He determined to cont inue making payments to 
^ - 7 - oUU27< 
Defendants until such time as hef Mr. Callf determined to assume 
the underlying loan against the property. Mr. Call did not 
thereafter assume the underlying loan. He continued to make 
payments to Defendants. 
9. Pursuant to the agreement and understanding of the 
parties, Defendants would remain the sole obligors under the loan 
from Western Savings & Loan Company, and the Company would not be 
informed of the purchase of the property. Under the agreement of 
the parties, Defendants would continue to make monthly payments to 
Western Savings & Loan Company, and Plaintiffs or their 
representative, Mr. Call, would pay Defendants ^476.00 per month* 
under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract until the 
contract balance was paid or the underlying loan was assumed. 
10. Mr. Call continued to make monthly payments to 
Defendants pursuant to the terms of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract on the first day of each month from February 1981 through 
January 1982. All payments made by Mr. Call including the initial 
down payment and balloon payment were derived from funds advanced 
to Mr. Call by Plaintiffs for the purpose of purchasing said 
property. 
11. Mr. Call defaulted in the making of the requisite 
monthly 'payments for January 1982 through August 1982, and the 
Defendants obtained a judgment against him for the past due 
*The actual monthly payment amount was initially $476.00, 
but pursuant to paragraph 3(c) of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
that amount increased yearly to reflect changes in the taxes due. 
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payments. Thereafter , Call continued in default and Defendants 
prepared to i n i t i a t e a second action against him in which they 
sought fo r fe i tu re of the cont rac t . Prior to the f i l i ng of the 
second complaint, P l a in t i f f John Whiteley s a t i s f i e d the i n i t i a l 
judgment by the payment of $3,317.51. Defendants then i n i t i a t e d 
the i r second c i v i l action captioned Sidney Seftel and Theresa 
Seftel v. Randy D. Cal l , Civil No. C82-9703 in the Third Jud ic ia l 
D i s t r i c t Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Upon rece ip t 
of service of the Complaint in that ac t ion , Mr. Call advised 
Defendants that he had assigned his i n t e r e s t in the property to 
P l a i n t i f f s . Thereafter, in Apri l , 1983, the Seftels caused the 
complaint to be amended and served upon John M. Whiteley. 
Following his answering the Sef te ls 1 Complaint, P la in t i f f John 
Whiteley and Mr. Call on July 29, 1983, entered into a s t i pu l a t i on 
pursuant to which they paid $4,760.00 representing 10 months of 
past due monthly payments and addi t iona l ly paid $1,900.00 at torney 
fees , and thereupon deposited an addi t ional $1,000.00 with the 
Seftels to be held by them for five years to be applied to any 
future defaults during the l i f e of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. Said action was dismissed August 31, 1983. 
12. Following the set t lement of the above-described 
ac t ion , P la in t i f f Whiteley again f e l l delinquent in making 
payments under the terms of the contract and the Defendants 
applied the above referenced $1,000.00 to cure those del inquencies . 
13. Subsequent to the conclusion of the above-described 
lawsui t , the P l a i n t i f f s assigned the i r i n t e r e s t in the property in 
question to Prisbrey Investment Company in consideration of a loan 
that Prisbrey Investment Company had made to Plaintiffs. 
Following that assignment, Prisbrey Investment Company made 
monthly payments to Defendants under the terms of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract for approximately one year. 
14. In February, 1985, John and Barbara Whiteley were 
indebted to Mr. Call on a previous business transaction. In that 
same month, Mr. Call paid approximately $3,500.00 to Prisbrey 
Investment Company for the subject property, and that entity 
relinquished to Mr. Call any and all interest it had in the 
property. On February 1, 1985, Prisbrey Investment Company had 
made a monthly payment to Defendants under the terms of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
15. On February 22, 1985, Plaintiff John Whiteley met 
with Randall Call and James Deans. At that meeting and in 
consideration of the payment of $7,000.00 from Mr. Deans, Mr. Call 
assigned by Assignment of Contract (Exhibit C) his interest in the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract to James Deans and delivered to Mr. 
Deans a Quit Claim Deed covering the property. Mr. Deans 
purchased this interest in the property at the request of 
Plaintiff John Whiteley and granted to Plaintiffs an option to 
acquire the interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract then held 
by Mr. Deans. 
16. On March 6, 1985, James Deans assigned by Assignment 
of Contract (Exhibit D) his interest in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract to Plaintiff, Barbara Whiteley, in consideration for the 
-10- '^\Ai273 
payment by Plaintiffs of $7,200.00. On March 20, 1985, Mr. Deans 
executed a Quit Claim Deed to Barbara Whiteley coverinq the 
subject property. 
17. On March 11, 1985, Barbara Whiteley accepted from 
Terry E. Bowns and JoAnn Bowns an offer for the purchase of the 
subject property (Exhibit E) for a price of $58,000.00. The 
closing of the transaction was to have been conducted in the 
offices of Associated Title Company at which time the unpaid loan 
balance owing to Western Savings & Loan was to be paid. 
(Exhibit F) 
18. On April 9, 1985, Plaintiffs <>r one of them caused 
the Warranty Deed (Exhibit B) from Defendants as grantor to 
Randy D. Call as grantee covering the property in question to be 
recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's loffice. Said deed was 
executed pursuant to the express terms of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (Exhibit A) under which the Defendants agreed to execute 
said deed conveying the subject property to the contract buyer 
with the deed to be held in escrow. Randy Call had delivered said 
deed to John Whiteley in April or May of 1981. The Plaintiffs and 
Defendants are not in agreement as to whether Plaintiffs retained 
possession of the deed or thereafter temporarily released 
possession and control pursuant to subsequent dealings with the 
subject property. Plaintiffs caused the deed to be recorded on 
April 9, 1985. 
19. Plaintiff John Whiteley telephoned Defendant Sidney 
Seftel. The Plaintiffs and Defendants are not in agreement as to 
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whether the telephone call was before or after the recording of 
the deed. In that telephone conversation Mr. Whiteley advised Mr. 
Seftel that Whiteleys were then in the process of selling the 
property and were prepared to pay the full amount that was then 
owed to Western Savings on the underlying loan and such amount/ if 
any, as may have been owing to Mr. and Mrs. Seftel. Mr. Whiteley 
made additional telephone calls to Mr. Seftel but received no 
response from him. 
20. Defendants did not advise Plaintiffs as to the 
amount which Defendants claimed to be owing under the contract. 
21. Plaintiff John Whiteley made additional attempts to 
obtain information regarding the amount claimed by Mr. Seftel to 
be owing under the contract. Mr. Whiteley made telephone inquiry 
of Devendants1 attorneys, Jeffrey W. Wilkinson and Daniel W. 
Jackson and on one occasion met personally with Mr. Jackson in Mr. 
Jacksonfs law office for the purpose of obtaining information as 
to the amounts claimed by Defendants to be owing under the 
contract. Defendants and their attorneys failed and refused to 
provide Plaintiffs with the requested information. 
22. Defendants claimed that they had an equity in the 
property. (Amended Answer and Counterclaim/ 115 of Second Defense.) 
23. Defendants claimed and represented that neither 
Randy Call nor Plaintiffs were entitled to the delivery of the 
Warranty Deed (Exhibit B) and on April 30/ 1985f did commence suit 
against Randy D. Call and Plaintiff John Whiteley in the above 
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e n t i t l e d court in Civi l Action No. C85-2749 a l leging tha t nei ther 
Mr. Call nor Mr. Whiteley had any r i g h t , t i t l e or i n t e r e s t in the 
subject property other than the r igh t to possession under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract and had no legal r igh t to have the 
subject Warranty Deed recorded (Exhibit G) and caused a Lis 
Pendens to be recorded on said date in the off ice of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder in Book 5650 at Page 845 giving notice of the 
pendency of said action and the a l lega t ions of the Complaint 
therein f i l e d . 
24. Defendants received no payment from P l a in t i f f s or 
any other persons under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract during March, 1985 or thereaf ter un t i l P l a i n t i f f s paid to 
Defendants the sum of $2,836.00 on October 21, 1985. Said amount 
represents approximately s ix monthly payments. No monthly 
payments had then been paid since February, 1985. P l a i n t i f f s have 
made no payments to Defendants following the October 21, 1985 
payment. 
25. In re la t ion to the proposed sa le of the property in 
question by Barbara Whiteley to the Bowns, cer ta in employees a t 
Associated T i t l e Company contacted the Defendants to inquire about 
the amount Defendants claimed to be owing under the subject 
cont rac t . During a subsequent inquiry , from Associated, the 
Defendants were informed for the f i r s t time bf the f i l i n g of the 
Warranty Deed. Upon being informed by Associated T i t l e Company of 
the f i l i n g of the Warranty Deed by P l a i n t i f f s , Defendants f i led 
^ - 1 3 -
 wOU276 
the said action in this Court identified as Civil No. C85-2749. 
26. On J u l y 13 , 1985, P l a i n t i f f Barbara Whiteley 
executed a second Warranty Deed cover ing the p rope r ty in q u e s t i o n 
g r a n t i n g the p rope r ty to Elan Management, I n c . Said Warranty Deed 
was f i l e d in the Sa l t Lake County Reco rde r ' s o f f i c e on J u l y 19, 
1985. T h e r e a f t e r , on September 15 , 1985, Elan Management, I n c . 
so ld a p o r t i o n of the po rpe r ty in q u e s t i o n to U.Q., I n c . for the 
sum of $65,200.00 and in p a r t i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n took back a Trus t 
Deed Note and an A l l - I n c l u s i v e Trus t Deed. 
27. On September 19, 1985, P l a i n t i f f John M. Whiteley 
s e n t a l e t t e r to Defendants by c e r t i f i e d mail in which he advised 
them t h a t the funds to pay your balance due on the p rope r ty in 
ques t i on were "now placed with Beehive T i t l e Company." The l e t t e r 
went on to s t a t e t h a t " i f you (Defendants) w i l l con tac t them with 
a r e l e a s e of your c o n t r a c t or o the r i n t e r e s t in the p rope r ty they 
w i l l make payment to you." In a d d i t i o n , the l e t t e r s t a t e d : "The 
t i t l e company has the f i n a l payoff f i gu re from the Western Savings 
and w i l l handle payment of t h a t ba lance as well as any amounts you 
have made to Western. Our r eco rds show you have made the payments 
from March 1 through August 1 , 1985, a t $486 per month, or 
$2 ,516 .00 , and t h i s amount should be re imbursed ." 
28. The tender of payment by P l a i n t i f f s as desc r ibed in 
the l e t t e r of September 19, 1985 was con t ingen t upon the 
Defendants1 r e l e a s e of any and a l l i n t e r e s t s they had in the 
p rope r ty in q u e s t i o n . At the time the l e t t e r was mailed by 
P l a i n t i f f John Whi te ley , c e r t a i n monies were held in escrow by 
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Beehive T i t l e Company. The P l a i n t i f f s and Defendants contest the 
source and amount of said monies. 
29. On August 28, 1985 and prior to the above-referenced 
l e t t e r . Defendants mailed to Randall D. Call and John Whiteley, 
notice (Exhibit H) advising tha t they were in default under the 
terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract ahd demanding pursuant 
to paragraph 16A of the contract tha t they cure the default or 
fo r fe i t a l l i n t e r e s t they may have in the property in quest ion. 
P l a in t i f f s caused Defendants to be advised that funds were on 
deposit with Beehive T i t l e Company with which to make ful l 
payment. Defendants served a Notice of Forfei ture (Exhibit I) 
upon Randy Call and John Whiteley on the 23ijd day of September, 
1985. On the same day, Defendants served a Notice to Quit 
(Exhibit J) on Messrs. Call and Whiteley. 
30. In response to the Defendants' Notices P l a in t i f f s 
f i led the above-referenced action on September 30, 1985 and caused 
a temporary r e s t r a in ing order to be issued by th i s court on 
October 1, 1985 enjoining Defendants from attempting to foreclose 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 i n t e r e s t in the property in quest ion. Thereafter on 
October 15, 1985, a hearing was held before th i s court and an 
injunction issued pending the outcome of t h i s ac t ion . Said 
injunction required p l a i n t i f f s to unconditionally tender to 
Defendants or the i r counsel the sum of $2,836.00 within five 
business days and enjoined Defendants from any action to declare a 
fo r fe i tu re or otherwise foreclose and deprivte P l a i n t i f f s of the i r 
i n t e r e s t in the property in quest ion. 
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3 1 , On October 2 3 , 1 9 8 5 , P l a i n t i f f t e n d e r e d s a i d amount 
t o D e f e n d a n t s ' c o u n s e l and have n o t made any a d d i t i o n a l payments 
t o Defendan t under t h e e x p r e s s t e rms of t h e Uniform Real E s t a t e 
C o n t r a c t . 
32 . D e f e n d a n t s c a u s e d P l a i n t i f f s t o be f i r s t a d v i s e d on 
A p r i l 14 , 1986 , t h a t De fendan t s do n o t now c l a i m any e q u i t y in t h e 
p r o p e r t y . 
CONTESTED FACTS 
The f o l l o w i n g remain as c o n t e s t e d f a c t s t o be r e s o l v e d a t 
t r i a l : 
1 . Was t h e W a r r a n t y Deed ( E x h i b i t B) t o have been h e l d 
in escrow u n t i l D e f e n d a n t s r e c e i v e d payment of t h e $ 1 0 , 7 4 7 . 0 0 due 
A p r i l 1 6 , 1981? When d id Mr. C a l l r e c e i v e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e deed? 
2 . P u r s u a n t t o t h e t e rms of t h e Uniform Real E s t a t e 
C o n t r a c t in q u e s t i o n , how l o n g was t h e War ran ty Deed t o be h e l d in 
e sc row? 
3 . Did t h e P l a i n t i f f s a t any t ime make an u n c o n d i t i o n a l 
t e n d e r t o De fendan t s of t h e b a l a n c e due under t h e t e rms of t h e 
Uniform Real E s t a t e C o n t r a c t ( E x h i b i t A)? 
4 . Were t h e P l a i n t i f f s in d e f a u l t a f t e r March 1 , 1985 
under t h e t e rms of t h e s a i d Uniform Rea l E s t a t e C o n t r a c t ? 
5 . When and how d id t h e De fendan t s f i r s t l e a r n of t h e 
a t t e m p t s of t h e P l a i n t i f f B a r b a r a W h i t e l e y t o s e l l t h e p r o p e r t y t o 
Mr. and Mrs. T e r r y Bown? 
6. Was Plaintiff Barbara Whiteley unable to consummate 
the sale of the property to Mr. and Mrs. Terry Bown because of the 
inability of Plaintiffs to obtain information from the Defendants 
regarding the amount claimed by the Defendants as owing under the 
contract and the representations and claims made by Defendants to 
the effect that the title and interest of Randy Call and Barbara 
Whiteley as his successor in interest was disputed by said 
Defendants? 
7. What was the source, purpose and amount of monies 
held by Beehive Title Company for payment on the unpaid balance of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract? 
8. At the time Plaintiff John Whiteley sent the letter 
of September 19, 1985, to Defendants, were Plaintiffs then in 
default under the express terms of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract as a result of their failure to make any payments to 
Defendants from March 1, 1985, to the time the letter was mailed. 
At the time Mr. Whiteley mailed the letter, were the Plaintiffs 
then insolvent and not have sufficient monies in their possession 
or control to make payment of the contract balance? 
9. Did Plaintiffs sustain damages as a result of an 
inability to obtain from Defendants a contract payoff balance and, 
if so, what was the amount of said damages? 
10. What amount of attorney fees should either 
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P l a i n t i f f s or D e f e n d a n t s be awarded? 
DATED t h i s 28th day of J u l y , 1986. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
. t o r n e y ^ f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
JACKS<W & WILKINSON 
D a n i e l W. J a c k s o n 
A t t o r n e y s for D e f e n d a n t s 
-yt 
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Gary A. Weston (3435) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
A t t o r n e y s for P l a i n t i f f s 
1100 B e n e f i c i a l L i f e Tower 
3 6 South S t a t e S t r e e t 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 53 2-1900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN M. WHITELEY, BARBARA ) 
WHITELEY, and ELAN MANAGEMENT, ] 
INC. , a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , ] 
P l a i n t i f f s , ] 
v . ] 
SIDNEY SEFTEL and THERESA ] 
SEFTEL, 1 
De fen dan t s . 
1 AMENDED 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
( CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i C i v i l No. C85-6571 
1 Ju<3ge B i l l i n g s 
T h i s m a t t e r came on for t r i a l on t h e 3 1 s t day of J u l y , 
1 9 8 6 , b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e J u d i t h M. B i l l i n g s , one of t h e j udges 
of t h e c o u r t , w i t h Gary A. Weston of t h e fii^m of N i e l s e n & Sen io r 
a p p e a r i n g as a t t o r n e y for t h e p l a i n t i f f s , and Dan ie l w. Jackson of 
t h e f i rm of J a c k s o n & Wi lk inson a p p e a r inq a s a t t o r n e y for t h e 
D e f e n d a n t s . The c o u r t took t e s t i m o n y and r e c e i v e d e x h i b i t s by way 
of e v i d e n c e on t h e i s s u e s , and c o u n s e l a d d r e s s e d t h e c o u r t 
r e g a r d i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of law t o t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d , and 
t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s F i n d i n g s of Fac t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law on 
August 2 7 , 1 9 8 6 . On September 2 3 , 1 9 8 6 , w i t h c o u n s e l for a l l 
p a r t i e s p r e s e n t , t h e c o u r t h e a r d D e f e n d a n t s 1 Motion t o Amend t h e 
C-AcL^ 
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Findings of Fact and Conclus ions of Law as p rev ious ly e n t e r e d . 
The cour t now makes and e n t e r s i t s Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The cour t adopts and inc ludes as p a r t of i t s f i n d i n g s , 
t h e fo l lowing paragraphs 1 through 32 which the p a r t i e s have 
s t i p u l a t e d as being uncontes ted f a c t s pursuant to t h e i r S t i p u l a t e d 
Statement of con t e s t ed and Uncontested Facts on f i l e with the 
cour t and dated J u l y 28 , 1986. 
1 . On or about J anua ry 8 , 1981 , Defendants , Sidney 
Sef t e l and Theresa S e f t e l , h i s w i f e , en te red i n t o a Uniform Real 
Es ta t e Con t r ac t with Randy D. Cal l (Exhib i t 1) cover ing the 
purchase by Mr. Ca l l of c e r t a i n r e a l e s t a t e l oca t ed a t 2337 East 
3395 South in S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of Utah, and more 
p a r t i c u l a r l y descr ibed a s : 
P a r t of t he Southwest Quar ter of t he Southeas t 
Quarter of Sec t ion 27 , Township 1 South, Range 
1 E a s t , S a l t Lake Base and Mer id ian , desc r ibed 
as fo l lows : 
COMMENCING 577.5 f ee t North and 208.6 fee t East 
of the Southwest corner of the Southeas t 
Quar ter of Sect ion 2 7 , Township 1 South, Range 
1 Eas t , Sa l t Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence South 236.4 f e e t ; thence East 77 
f e e t ; thence North 236.4 f e e t ; thence West 77 
f e e t to t he p lace of b e g i n n i n g . 
2. At the time of the execu t ion of the sa id Uniform Real 
E s t a t e C o n t r a c t , Defendants executed a Warranty Deed (Exhib i t 2) 
wherein Mr. Ca l l was named as g ran tee of the p roper ty in q u e s t i o n 
and placed sa id deed in escrow wi th Colony T i t l e company. 
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3 . At t he time Randall Ca l l en te red i n to the Uniform 
Real E s t a t e Cont rac t in q u e s t i o n , he was a c t i n g as an und i sc losed 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of P l a i n t i f f John M. Whiteley who owned p rope r ty 
ad jacen t to the p roper ty in q u e s t i o n . At the time the c o n t r a c t 
was execu ted , Mr. c a l l and P l a i n t i f f s were aware t h a t an 
o b l i g a t i o n of $45,253.00 owing by Sidney and Theresa Sef te l to 
Western Savings & Loan Company was secured by a t r u s t deed l i e n 
a g a i n s t the p roper ty in q u e s t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , the p a r t i e s 
understood and knew t h a t t he loan from Western Savings & Loan 
Company contained a Due on Sales c lause and was not assumable . 
4 . At the t ime t h e c o n t r a c t was execu ted , Mr. c a l l paid 
Mr. Sef te l $5,000.00 cash as down payment and p a r t i a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n for the purchase of the p rope r ty under the terms and 
cond i t i ons of the Uniform Real E s t a t e C o n t r a c t . T h e r e a f t e r , on 
February 1, 1981 , Mr. Call made the f i r s t monthly payment to 
Defendants in the amount of $471.00 for p r i n c i p a l , i n t e r e s t and 
t a x e s , plus $5.00 s e r v i c e charge pursuant to the terms of the 
Uniform Real E s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
5 . On or about Apri l 16 , 1981 , Mr. Call paid to Mr . and 
Mrs. Se f te l the sum of $10,747.00 as a ba l loon payment pursuant to 
t h e terms of the uniform Real Es ta t e C o n t r a c t . This payment 
completed the payment of $15,747.00 as provided in paragraph 3 of 
t h e Con t r ac t and reduced the o u t s t a n d i n g ba lance due under the 
Purchase Agreement to 345 ,253 .00 , l e s s the po r t i on of the monthly 
payments paid for each of the months of February , March and Apri l 
as were a t t r i b u t a b l e to a repayment of p r i n c i p a l . This amount was 
then cons idered by the p a r t i e s to be the amount then owing to 
Western Savings & Loan Company on the under ly ing t r u s t deed l o a n . 
6 . The $5,000.00 paid by Mr. Call a t t h e time of t h e 
execu t ion of the c o n t r a c t p lus the $10,747.00 which he paid on or 
about Apri l 16 , 1981 , r e p r e s e n t e d the amount of 5tl5 ,74 7.00 which 
was the equ i ty which Mr. and Mrs. Sef te l had in the p roper ty a t 
the t ime of t h e i r c o n t r a c t s a l e . 
7 . After payment of $10 ,747 .00 , Defendants remained as 
record owners of the p rope r ty pursuant to the' terms of t h e i r 
c o n t r a c t with Mr. Call to a t tempt to avoid an i n c r e a s e in t he 
i n t e r e s t r a t e on the t r u s t deed loan a g a i n s t the p roper ty or the 
a c c e l e r a t i o n of payment of t he loan b a l a n c e . 
8 . Mr. c a l l r e c e i v e d , but did no t record the war ran ty 
deed (Exh ib i t 2 ) . He determined to con t inue making payments to 
Defendants u n t i l such time as h e , Mr. C a l l , determined to assume 
t h e unde r ly ing loan a g a i n s t t h e p r o p e r t y . Mr. Call did not 
t h e r e a f t e r assume the under ly ing l o a n . He cont inued to make 
pa ymen t s to De fen dan t s . 
9 . Pursuant to the agreement and under s t and ing of t h e 
p a r t i e s , Defendants would remain the s o l e o b l i g o r s under the loan 
from Western Savings & Loan Company, and the Company would no t be 
informed of the purchase of the p r o p e r t y . Under the agreement of 
the p a r t i e s , Defendants would con t inue to make monthly payments to 
Western Savings & Loan company, and P l a i n t i f f s or t h e i r 
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r ep resen ta t ive , Mr. c a l l , would pay Defendants $476.00 per month* 
10. Mr. Call continued to make monthly payments to 
Defendants pursuant to the terms of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract on the f i r s t day of each month from February 1981 through 
January 1982. All payments made by Mr. Call including the i n i t i a l 
down payment and balloon payment were derived from funds advanced 
to Mr. Call by P l a i n t i f f s for the purpose of purchasing said 
property. 
1 1 . Mr. Call defaulted in the making of the r equ i s i t e 
monthly payments for January 1982 through August 1982, and the 
Defendants obtained a judgment against him for the past due 
payments. Thereafter , Call continued in default and Defendants 
prepared to i n i t i a t e a second action against him in which they 
sought for fe i ture of the cont rac t . Prior to the f i l ing of the 
second complaint, P la in t i f f John Whiteley s a t i s f i e d the i n i t i a l 
judgment by the payment of ^3,317.51. Defendants then i n i t i a t e d 
their second c i v i l action captioned Sidney Seftel and Theresa 
Seftel v. Randy p. Ca l l , Civi l No. C82-9703 in the Third Jud ic i a l 
D i s t r i c t court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Upon receipt 
of service of the Complaint in that ac t ion , Mr. Call advised 
Defendants tha t he had assigned his i n t e r e s t in the property to 
P l a i n t i f f s . Thereaf ter , in Apri l , 19 83, the Seftels caused the 
*The actual monthly payment amount was i n i t i a l l y $476.00, 
but pursuant to paragraph 3(c) of the Uniform Real Estate contract 
that amount increased yearly to r e f l e c t changes in the taxes due 
under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract un t i l the 
contract balance was paid or the underlying loan was assumed. 
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complaint to be amended and served upon John M. Whiteley. 
Following h i s answering the Sef te ls 1 Complaint, P l a i n t i f f John 
Whiteley and Mr. Call on Ju ly 29, 1983, entered into a s t i pu l a t i on 
pursuant to which they paid $4 ,760.00 represent ing 10 months of 
past due monthly payments and add i t iona l ly paid $1,900.00 a t torney 
fees , and thereupon deposited an addi t ional $1,000.00 with the 
Seftels to be held by them for five years to be applied to any 
future defaul ts during the l i f e of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract . Said action was dismissed August 3 1 , 1983. 
12. Following the set t lement of the above-descr ibed 
ac t ion , P l a in t i f f Whiteley again fe l l delinquent in making 
payments under the terms of the contract and the Defendants 
applied the above referenced $1,000.00 to cure those del inquencies . 
13. Subsequent to the conclusion of the above-descr ibed 
lawsui t , the P l a i n t i f f s assigned thei r i n t e r e s t in the property in 
question to Prisbrey investment Company in consideration of a loan 
that Pr isbrey investment Company had made to P l a i n t i f f s . 
Following that assignment, Pr isbrey investment Company made 
monthly payments to Defendants under the terms of the uniform Real 
Estate Contract for approximately one year. 
14. in February, 1985, John and Barbara Whiteley were 
indebted to Mr. Call on a previous business t ransac t ion , in tha t 
same month, Mr. Call paid approximately $3,500.00 to Pr isbrey 
Investment Company for the subject property, and that en t i ty 
rel inquished to Mr. Call any and a l l i n t e r e s t i t had in the 
property. On February 1, 1985, Prisbrey investment Company had 
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made a monthly payment to Defendants under the terms of the 
Uniform Real E s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
1 5 . On February 22, 1985, P l a i n t i f f John Whiteley met 
with Randall c a l l and James Deans. At t h a t meeting and in 
cons ide ra t i on of the payment of $7,000.00 from Mr. Deans, Mr. Call 
a ss igned by Assignment of Cont rac t ( E x h i b i t 3) h i s i n t e r e s t in the 
Uniform Real Es ta t e Cont rac t to James Deans and d e l i v e r e d to Mr. 
Deans a Quit Claim Deed covering the p r o p e r t y . Mr. Deans 
purchased t h i s i n t e r e s t in the p rope r ty a t t he r e q u e s t of 
P l a i n t i f f John Whiteley and granted to P l a i n t i f f s an op t ion to 
acqu i re the i n t e r e s t in the uniform Real Es ta t e Cont rac t then held 
by Mr. Deans. 
16 . On March 6 , 1985, James Deans ass igned by Assignment 
of Cont rac t ( E x h i b i t 4) h i s i n t e r e s t in the Uniform Real Es t a t e 
Cont rac t to P l a i n t i f f , Barbara Whi te ley , in cons ide ra t i on for the 
payment by P l a i n t i f f s of ^ 7 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 . °° March 20, 1985, Mr. Deans 
executed a Qui t Claim Deed to Barbara Whiteley cover ing the 
s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y . 
1 7 . On March 1 1 , 1985, Barbara Whiteley accepted from 
Terry E. Bowns and JoAnn Bowns an of fer for the purchase of the 
s u b j e c t p rope r ty (Exhib i t 5) for a p r i c e of $58,000.00 . The 
c los ing of the t r a n s a c t i o n was to have been conducted in the 
o f f i c e s of Associa ted T i t l e Company a t which time t h e unpaid loan 
ba lance owing to Western Savings & Loan was to be pa id . 
1 8 . On Apri l 9 , 1985, P l a i n t i f f s or one of them caused 
the Warranty Deed ( E x h i b i t 2) from Defendants as qrantor to 
- 2 5 -
Randy D. Call as grantee covering the property in question to be 
recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's o f f i ce . Said deed was 
executed pursuant to the express terms of the uniform Real Estate 
Contract (Exhibit 1) under which the Defendants agreed to execute 
said deed conveying the subject property to the contract buyer 
with the deed to be held in escrow. Randy ca l l had del ivered said 
deed to John Whiteley in April or May of 1981. P l a i n t i f f s caused 
the deed to be recorded on April 9 , 1985. 
19. P l a i n t i f f John Whiteley telephoned Defendant Sidney 
S e f t e l . In tha t telephone conversation Mr. Whiteley advised Mr. 
Seftel tha t Whiteleys were then in the process of s e l l i n g the 
property and were prepared to pay the ful l amount tha t was then 
owed to Western Savings on the underlying loan and such amount, i f 
any, as may have been owing to Mr. and Mrs. Se f t e l . Mr. Whiteley 
made addi t iona l telephone ca l l s to Mr. Seftel but received no 
response from him. 
20. Defendants did not advise P l a i n t i f f s as to the 
amount which Defendants claimed to be owing under the con t rac t . 
21 . P l a in t i f f John Whiteley made addi t ional attempts to 
obtain information regarding the amount claimed by Mr. Seftel to 
be owing under the con t r ac t . Mr. Whiteley made telephone inquiry 
of Deven.dants' a t t o rneys , Jeffrey W. Wilkinson and Daniel w. 
Jackson and on one occasion met personal ly with Mr. Jackson in Mr. 
Jackson fs law off ice for the purpose of obtaining information as 
to the amounts claimed by Defendants to be owing under the 
/ -
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cont rac t . Defendants and thei r a t torneys failed and refused to 
provide P l a i n t i f f s with the requested information. 
22. Defendants claimed tha t they had an equity in the 
property. 
23. Defendants claimed and represented that neither 
Randy Call nor P l a i n t i f f s were en t i t l ed to the delivery of the 
Warranty Deed (Exhibit 2) and on April 30, 1985, did commence s u i t 
against Randy D. Call and P l a in t i f f John Whiteley in the above 
en t i t l ed court in Civi l Action No. C85-2749 a l leging tha t neither 
Mr. Call nor Mr. Whiteley had any r i g h t , t i t l e or i n t e r e s t in the 
subject property other than the r i gh t to possession under the 
Uniform Real Estate contract and had no legal r igh t to have the 
subject Warranty Deed recorded (Exhibit 7) and caused a Lis 
Pendens to be recorded on said date in the off ice of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder in Book 5650 at Page 845 giving notice of the 
pendency of said act ion and the a l l ega t ions of the Complaint 
therein f i l e d . 
24. Defendants received no payment from P l a i n t i f f s or 
any other persons under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract during March, 1985 or thereafter unt i l P l a i n t i f f s paid to 
Defendants the sum of $2,836.00 o n October 21 , 1985. Said amount 
represents approximately s ix monthly payments. No monthly 
payments had then been paid since February, 1985. P l a i n t i f f s have 
made no payments to Defendants following the October 2 1 , 1985 
payment. 
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25. In re la t ion to the proposed sa le of the property in 
question by Barbara Whiteley to the Bowns, cer ta in employees a t 
Associated T i t l e Company contacted the Defendants to inquire about 
the amount Defendants claimed to be owing under the subject 
con t rac t . During a subsequent inqui ry , from Associated, the 
Defendants were informed for the f i r s t time of the f i l i ng of the 
Warranty Deed. Upon being informed by Associated T i t l e Company of 
the f i l i ng of the Warranty Deed by P l a i n t i f f s , Defendants f i led 
the said action in th i s Court iden t i f i ed as Civi l NO. C85-2749. 
26. On July 13, 1985, P l a i n t i f f Barbara Whiteley 
executed a second Warranty Deed covering the property in question 
granting the property to Elan Management, Inc . Said Warranty Deed 
was f i led in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office on Ju ly 19, 
1985. Thereaf ter , on September 15, 1985, Elan Management, I n c . 
sold a portion of the porperty in question to U.Q., i nc . for the 
sum of 365,200.00 and in p a r t i a l consideration took back a Trust 
Deed Note and an Al l - Inc lus ive Trust Deed. 
27. On September 19, 1985, P l a i n t i f f John M. Whiteley 
sent a l e t t e r to Defendants by c e r t i f i e d mail in which he advised 
them that the funds to pay your balance due on the property in 
question were "now placed with Beehive T i t l e Company." The l e t t e r 
went on to s t a t e that "if you (Defendants) wi l l contact them with 
a re lease of your contract or other i n t e r e s t in the property they 
wi l l make payment to you." In addi t ion , the l e t t e r s t a t e d : "The 
t i t l e company has the f inal payoff f igure from the Western Savings 
and wi l l handle payment of that balance as well as any amounts you 
-/-
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have made to Western. Our records show you have made the payments 
from March 1 through August 1, 19 85, at ^4 86 per month, or 
$2/516.00, and th i s amount should be reimbursed." 
28. The tender of payment by P l a i n t i f f s as described in 
the l e t t e r of September 19, 1985 was contingent upon the 
Defendants1 re lease of any and a l l i n t e r e s t s they had in the 
property in ques t ion. At the time the l e t t e r was mailed by 
P la in t i f f John Whiteley, cer ta in monies were held in escrow by 
Beehive T i t l e Company. 
29. On August 28, 1985 and prior to the above-referenced 
l e t t e r , Defendants mailed to Randall D. Call and John Whiteley, 
notice (Exhibit 8) advising tha t they were in default under the 
terms of the Uniform Real Estate contract and demanding pursuant 
to paragraph 16A of the contract tha t they cure the default or 
for fe i t a l l i n t e r e s t they may have in the property in ques t ion . 
P l a in t i f f s caused Defendants to be advised tha t funds were on 
deposit with Beehive T i t l e Company with which to make full 
payment. Defendants served a Notice of Forfei ture (Exhibit 9) 
upon Randy Call and John Whiteley on the 23rd day of September, 
1985. On the same day, Defendants served a Notice to Quit 
(Exhibit 10) on Messrs. Call and Whiteley. 
30. In response to the Defendants1 Notices P l a i n t i f f s 
f i led the above-referenced act ion on September 30, 1985 and caused 
a temporary r e s t r a in ing order to be issued b^ th i s court on 
October 1, 1985 enjoining Defendants from attempting to foreclose 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 i n t e r e s t in the property in quest ion. Thereafter on 
October 15, 19 85, a hearing was held before th i s court and an 
injunction issued pending the outcome of th i s ac t ion . Paid 
injunction required p l a i n t i f f s to uncondit ional ly tender to 
Defendants or their counsel the sum of $2,836.00 within five 
business days and enjoined Defendants from any action to declare a 
fo r fe i tu re or otherwise foreclose and deprive P l a i n t i f f s of thei r 
i n t e r e s t in the property in ques t ion . 
3 1 . On October 23, 1985, P la in t i f f tendered said amount 
to Defendants' counsel and have not made any addi t ional payments 
to Defendant under the express terms of the uniform Real Estate 
Contract . 
32. Defendants caused P l a i n t i f f s to be f i r s t advised on 
April 14, 1986, that Defendants do not now claim any equity in the 
proper ty . 
The court makes the following addi t ional Findings of 
Fact: 
33. P l a in t i f f , John Whiteley, spoke by telephone with 
Defendant, Sid Sef te l , on approximately March 11 , 19 85, and 
advised Mr. Seftel tha t P l a i n t i f f , Barbara Wiiteley, had a buyer 
for the subject property, and incident to the sa le of said 
property she would make payment of the t o t a l amount owing to 
Western Savings and such amounts, i f any, as owing to Defendants. 
John Whiteley requested Sid Seftel to advise him as to the 
amounts, i f any, which Defendants claimed to be owing to them 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract . 
' - i n -
34. Associa ted T i t l e Company te lephoned Defendant, Sid 
S e f t e l , and advised t h a t i t was handl ing the c l o s i n g of the s a l e 
of the s u b j e c t p rope r ty by Barbara Whiteley and t h a t pursuan t to 
the c l o s i n g of the s a l e , f u l l payment would be made of the amounts 
owing to Western Savings and the amounts, i f any , owing to 
Defendants and reques ted t h a t Mr. Se f t e l adv i se them as to what, 
i f any, amounts were then due and owing to Defendants under the 
Uniform Real E s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
3 5 . Mr. Sidney Sef te l fs f a i l u r e and r e f u s a l to provide 
John Whiteley and Associa ted T i t l e Company With the information 
reques ted as to t h e amounts which he claimed was owing to 
Defendants under the Uniform Real E s t a t e c o n t r a c t f r u s t r a t e d the 
e f f o r t s of P l a i n t i f f s to de termine t h e amounts owing to Defendants 
under the Cont rac t and to complete the s a l e of the sub j ec t 
p roper ty to Terry E. Bowns and joAnne Bowns,. 
36. Terry E. Bowns and JoAnne Bowns were prepared to 
complete the purchase of the s u b j e c t p rope r ty from Barbara 
Whiteley and would have completed sa id purchase had Defendants 
provided Associa ted T i t l e with the r eques t ed information as to the 
amounts then claimed to be owing by Defendants under the Uniform 
Real Es t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
37 . Associa ted T i t l e Company was involved in a s s i s t i n g 
Barbara Whiteley and Mr. and Mrs. Terry Bowns in c lo s ing the s a l e 
of the s u b j e c t p rope r ty from Mrs. Whiteley to Mr. and Mrs. Bowns, 




hold funds su f f i c i en t to make payment of the amounts as then due 
and owing to the Defendants under the Uniform Heal Estate c o n t r a c t . 
38. At the time Sidney Seftel f i r s t refused to provide 
to P l a i n t i f f s and Associated T i t l e Company the requested 
information regarding the amounts then claimed by the Defendants 
to be owing to them under the Uniform Real Estate c o n t r a c t , sa id 
Defendants had no equity in the property and the contract 
ins ta l lment payments were delinquent only for the months of March, 
1985, and perhaps, the month of Apr i l , 19 85. 
39. The l e t t e r of Defendants' a t to rney , Jeffrey W. 
Wilkinson, dated August 28, 1985 (Exhibit 8 ) , was the f i r s t 
wri t ten no t i f i ca t ion given after March 1, 1985, by Defendants to 
P l a i n t i f f s that P l a i n t i f f s were claimed to be in default under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract . Said l e t t e r fa i led to specify the 
amount which Defendants then claimed to be delinquent under sa id 
con t rac t . 
40. Defendants' Notice of Forfei ture (Exhibit 9) was 
served upon p l a i n t i f f s on September 23, 1985, and const i tu ted the 
f i r s t no t i f i ca t ion given to P l a i n t i f f s from and after March 1, 
1985, as to the amount which Defendants claimed as delinquent 
monthly insta l lments owing under the uniform Real Estate 
Contract . Prior to the rece ip t of said Notice of For fe i tu re , 
P l a i n t i f f s did not know the amount which Defendants claimed to be 
delinquent under the cont rac t . 
41 . Defendants have cont inual ly claimed tha t the subject 
property was the i r s and that they had defaulted the P l a i n t i f f s out 
from any i n t e r e s t in the proper ty . 
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42. In August and September
 f 1985, Beehive T i t l e Company 
contacted Defendants' a t torneys requesting information as to the 
amounts which Defendants then claimed to be owing to the 
Defendants under the Uniform Real Estate Contract and advised 
Defendants' a t torneys tha t there was on deposit with Beehive T i t l e 
funds with which to make payment in ful l of the amounts owing to 
Western Savings and amounts then delinquent and owing to 
Defendants under the Uniform Real Estate Contract . Defendants and 
the i r at torneys fai led and refused to provide the requested 
information to Beehive T i t l e , thereby f rus t ra t ing the attempts of 
Beehive T i t l e to consummate the payoff to Western Savings and to 
Defendants and preventing said payoff. Beehive Ti t le then held on 
deposit funds su f f i c i en t to have made ful l payment of the amounts 
owing by P l a i n t i f f s under the Uniform Real fcstate con t rac t . 
43. Defendants have continued to rrtake monthly payments 
to Western Savings and were current on theii^ payments through the 
month of Ju ly , 1986. 
44. The conduct of Defendants has not caused P l a i n t i f f s 
to susta in damages. 
45. P l a in t i f f s have incurred at torney fees with regard 
to the herein ac t ion . They have incurred at torney fees in an 
amount of $1,580.00 with their former counsel of record, Mr. 
Grant G, Or ton, and with their current counsel of record, Gary A. 
Weston and Nielsen & Senior, in an amount of $5,140.00. Said 
at torney fees are fair and reasonable with regard to the services 
rendered to P l a i n t i f f s by said a t to rneys . 
-X-
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46 , No evidence was r ece ived by t h e c o u r t r e l a t i v e to 
a t t o r n e y fees incur red by the Defendants . 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fac t , the cour t now makes 
and e n t e r s i t s conc lu s ions of Law as fo l lows: 
1. The declara t ions and statements made by P l a i n t i f f , 
John Whiteley, and by Associated T i t l e company and Beehive T i t l e 
Company const i tu ted su f f i c i en t and proper tender to Defendants of 
the t o t a l amounts then due and owing to Defendants under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract . 
2. The conduct of Defendants in withholding information 
from P l a i n t i f f s with regard to the amounts which Defendants claim 
to be due and owing under the uniform Real Estate Contract was 
improper and f rus t ra ted the e f fo r t s of the P l a i n t i f f s to make 
payment to Defendants of the t o t a l amounts owing under the uniform 
Real Estate Contract and thereby f rus t ra ted P l a i n t i f f s ' attempts 
a t tender to Defendants of the amounts owing under the contract 
and thereby excused P l a i n t i f f s from tender in a form or manner 
d i f fe ren t than that undertaken by P l a i n t i f f s . 
3. Defendants were not j u s t i f i ed in refusing to provide 
to P l a i n t i f f s and the t i t l e insurance company the requested 
information regarding the amounts claimed by the Defendants as 
delinquent and due and owing under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract . 
-X- ^^ 
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4. Defendants did f r u s t r a t e , i n t e r f e re with and prevent 
the sale of the subject property to Mr. and Mrs. Terry Bowns by 
Barbara Whiteley. 
5 . Defendants fai led to give to P l a i n t i f f s the r equ i s i t e 
not ice of default as contemplated and required under Paragraph 16 
of the uniform Real Estate Contract andf the re fore , have fa i led to 
place P l a i n t i f f s in default under the terms of said contract . If 
proper notice had been given, P la in t i f f s would have been required 
to have responded the re to . 
6. P l a in t i f f s are not e n t i t l e d to an award of damages 
a ga ins t De f en dan ts . 
7. Defendants breached the i r contractual obl igat ions to 
P l a i n t i f f s under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract in 
that Defendants fai led and refused to permit payment by P l a i n t i f f s 
of the amounts due and owing by P l a i n t i f f s to Defendants 
thereunder said con t rac t . P l a in t i f f s are not in default under the 
terms of said cont rac t . 
8. The warranty deed (Exhibit 2) did not cons t i tu te 
Defendants1 conveyance of legal t i t l e of the subject property. 
9. Defendants breached an express covenant and 
obligat ion of the Uniform Real Estate cont rac t by fa i l ing and 
refusing to deliver to P l a i n t i f f s t i t l e to the property as 
described in said cont rac t . 
10. Judgment should be entered as follows: 
a. Ordering Defendants to execute and deliver to 
P l a in t i f f , Elan Management, i n c . , a general warranty deed 
-x- * i 
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conveying to said P l a i n t i f f the i n t e r e s t of Defendants in 
the hereinabove described proper ty , subject only to such 
l i en s and encumbrance as were of record against said 
property on date of the Uniform Real Estate Contract of 
January 8, 1981. This r e l i e f is awarded said P l a i n t i f f 
pursuant to Rule 54(c ) , Utah Rules of c iv i l Procedure. 
b . Ordering P l a i n t i f f s to make payment on or before 
15 days from date of entry hereof, as follows: 
(1) To Defendants, a l l amounts paid by 
Defendants to Western Savings and Loan since 
February, 1985, l e s s the amount of $2,836.00 paid by 
P l a in t i f f s to Defendants in October 15, 19 85, 
pursuant to the then order of th is court . 
(2) To Western Savings, fu l l payment of a l l 
amounts current ly due and owing to Western Savings 
and Loan Association by Defendants under the Trust 
Deed Note against the hereinabove described property 
subject of th i s ac t ion . P l a in t i f f s sha l l apply 
towards said payment, the amount of $20,000.00, 
together with i n t e r e s t accrued thereon, as is 
cur rent ly held on deposit with Western Pavings 
pursuant to the terms of tha t cer ta in St ipula t ion of 
P l a i n t i f f s and Defendants with Western Savings dated 
January 15 , 1986, on f i l e in th i s ac t ion . 
c. Awarding to P l a i n t i f f s judgment against 
Defendants for a t torney fees of $6,720.00. 
-X-
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d. Awarding to P l a i n t i f f s the i r costs herein 
incurred. 
1 1 . Defendants have no cause of action against 
P l a i n t i f f s under their counterclaim. 
DATED t h i s j ^ / day of (9cu^Ms^ , 1986. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
. ,/L , ^ 2&***^-y 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Defendants 
rDITH K. BILLINGS 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
H. u'u^Zri h.Ml'-ud' 
By r.:fki Om\ 
&**Jty C*rk 
- 3 7 -
iKJJ** 
Jeffrey W. Wilkinson 
Law Office 
JACKSON & WILKINSON 
A Professional Corporation 
40 East South Temple, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 538-0645 
August 28, 1985 
Randy D. Call 
4764 Quail Point Rd. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Re: Uniform Real Estate Contract between Sidney and Theresa 
Seftel (Seller) and Randy D. Call (Purchaser) 
Dear Mr. Call: 
On January 8, 1981, Sidney and Theresa Seftel agreed to 
sell you the real property located at 2331 East 3395 South. 
Enclosed is a copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. You are 
presently delinquent and have been so for over thirty days on 
the monthly payments you agreed to make to the Seftels pursuant 
to the Contract. 
You are hereby given notice pursuant to paragraph 16 of 
the Contract that you have five days in which to remedy this 
default. If the default is not remedied within five days, the 
Seftels shall be released from all obligations in law and in 
equity to convey said property, and all payments which have been 
made theretofore on the contract by you shall be forfeited to 
the Seftels as liquidated damages for the 
contract and the Seftels may re-enter and 








Very truly yours,'• 
v. 
JEFFREY W. WILKINSON 
JWW/ms 
cc: John Whitely 
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CLOSING DATE: April 8, 19,5* ORDER NO.: 42766-12 
SELLER: Whiteley, Barbara 
MAILING ADDRESS: 
PHCNE NUMBERS: HOME: 
BUYER: Bowns. Terry P.. & Jo Anne 
WORK: COPIES RECEIVED: 
MAILING ADDRESS: 3333 South 3175 East, Salt Lafre Citv. Utah 84109 
PHCNE NUMBERS: HOME: WORK: __ COPIES RECEIVED: 
PROPERTY ADDRESS: 2337 East 3395 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
LISTING AGENT: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
PHONE NUMBERS: HCME: 
SELLING A2ENT: 
PHCNE NIWBERS: HCME: 
INSURANCE CCMPANY: 
ADDRESS: 
SALES PRICE: *? 58,000.00 
ESCROW OFFICER:"" Stephanie"" 
WORK: COPIES RECEIVED: 
WORK: COPIES RECEIVED: 
AGENT: 
' PHCNE: 
LDAN AMOUNT $ N/A 
XHKKmKX:Laura, Assistant Escrow Off i ceF 
CHECK NUMBER TO WHOM REGARDING AM3UNT 
ASSOCIATED T T T I £ CCMPANY 
/Z<x^-+~+-*~> A) kJdzJbuj 
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SHORI . R LCNG TERM ESOOW 
$ 
TOTAL DISBURSED: $ S3. ?0>/,fld._ 
- 3 9 -
YtjfWOol'no.. 
•/ - >->C i. 
^ .e. -;-. ^ 'v 
- 4 0 -
DANIEL W. J A C K S O N , P. C . 
L A W O F F I C E S 
jfiCKSon & wiLKinson 
A PARTNERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 
ARROW P R E S S S Q U A R E , S U I T E 2 0 0 
165 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE 
SALT LAK€ CITY, UTfiH 84101 
T E L E P H O N E 
(SOI) 3 2 8 - I S O O 
September 12, 1986 




c/o Gary A. Weston, Esq. 
Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Uniform Real Estate Contract dated January 8, 1981 
between Sidney and Theresa Seftel (Seller) and Randy D. 
Call (Purchaser). 
Dear Mr. Weston: 
On January 8, 1981, Sidney and Theresa Seftel entered 
into the above-referenced Uniform Real Estate Contract with 
Randy D. Call, a copy of which is attached hereto. Pursuant to 
various assignments, Elan Management, John Whiteley and/or 
Barbara Whiteley have acquired Mr. Callfs interest in that 
contract. 
On August 27, 1986, the Honorable Judith W. Billings 
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in 
which the Court ordered that on or before 15 days of the entry 
of the judgment in Civil Proceeding No. C85-6571, John 
Whiteley, Barbara Whiteley and Elan Management were to pay to 
Sidney and Theresa Seftel all amounts which they had paid 
Western Savings and Loan since February, 1985, less the amount 
of $2,836.00. 
John Whiteley, Barbara Whiteley and Elan Management 
failed to make the payment as ordered by the court and are 
presently delinquent in monthly payments and have been so for 
over thirty days. In fact, those parties have made no monthly 
payments under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
since the payment of $2,83 6.00, pursuant to an Order of the 





Therefore John Whiteley, Barbara Whiteley and Elan 
Management have failed to pay 4 monthly payments in 1985 in the 
amount of $475,00 plus $5.00 service fee and 9 monthly payments 
in the amount of $483.00 plus $5.00 service fee in 1986. This 
represents a total delinquency under the terms of the contract 
of $6,512.54. [In addition, Mr. Seftel paid $120.54 to Western 
Savings & Loan as an additional payment in 1985. This amount, 
while due under the terms of the Court fs order, is not being 
assessed as a delinquent monthly payment.] 
Pursuant to the terms of paragraph 16A of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract this letter constitutes written notice 
that your clients, John Whiteley, Barbara Whiteley and Elan 
Management are in default under the terms of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract in the amount of $6,512.54. If your clients do 
not remedy the default within five days of this written notice, 
the Sellers, Sidney and Theresa Seftel, will exercise their 
rights under paragraph 16A of the contract to be released from 
all obligations in law and equity to convey said property and 
all payments which have been made theretofore on the Contract 
shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for the 
non-performance of the Contract and the Seftels may re-enter 
and take possession of the premises without legal process. 
This notice is not intended nor should it be interpreted 
as a waiver, release or acquiescence in your clients' failure 
to comply with the court's judgment entered on August 27, 
1986. And this notice is not intended to constitute an 
extension of time in which to make the payments as required by 
the Court's judgment. 
Very truly yours, 





jflCKSon & ujiLKinson 
DANIEL W. J A C K S O N , P. C . A PARTNERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 
ARROW P R E S S S Q U A R E , S U I T E 2 0 0 
165 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE 
SALT LflK€ CITU, UTAH 84101 
September 19, 1986 




c/o Gary A. Weston, Esq. 
Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Uniform Real Estate Contract dated January 8, 1981 
between Sidney and Theresa Seftel (Seller) and Randy 
D. Call (Purchaser). 
Dear Mr. Weston: 
Please be advised that it is our belief and position 
that your clients have already forfeited their interest in the 
property. 
However, in order to fully protect our clients1 
position, enclosed is a Declaration of Forfeiture pursuant to 
the Notice of Forfeiture that was served upon you by hand 
delivery on September 12, 1986. 





DECLARATION OF FORFEITURE 
To: JOHN M. WHITELEY, BARBARA WHITELEY AND ELAN 
MANAGEMENT, INC. 
c/o Gary A. Weston 
Attorney for John M. Whiteley 
Nielsen & Senior 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
You are hereby notified that you are in default under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated January 8, 1981, wherein 
SIDNEY SEFTEL and THERESA SEFTEL are named Seller and RANDY D. 
CALL is named Buyer of the property located at 2337 East 3395 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, more fully described as follows: 
Part of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
of Section 27, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, described as follows: 
Commencing 577.5 feet North and 208.6 feet East of the 
Southwest corner of the Southeast Quarter of Section 
27, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence South 236.4 feet; thence 
East 77 feet; thence North 236.4 feet; thence West 77 
feet to the place of beginning. 
Payments in the amount of $6,312.00 are delinquent. 
Gary A. Weston as attorney for John M. Whiteley, 
Barbara Whiteley and Elan Management, Inc. was sent a notice of 
intent to declare forfeiture by Seller. You were notified that 
if the above amounts were not paid within five (5) days of 
receipt of such Notice, a forfeiture would be declared by 
Seller. The above payments were not made within five days of 
the receipt of said Notice. 
uOO40 
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The Seller now exercises his remedy and declares a 
forfeiture under paragraph 16(A) of th& Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. Such paragraph provides that following your failure 
to remedy the default within five days after written notice, the 
Sellers are now released from all obligations in law and in 
equity to convey the property to you, and all payments which 
have been made previously on this Contract are forfeited to the 
Seller as liquidated damages for non-perforHance of the Contract. 
Further, pursuant to paragraph 16(A) of the Contract, 
the Seller exercises his option to re-enter and take possession 
of the premises without legal process, together with all 
improvements and additions you have made thereon and hereby 
notifies you that you are not tenants at will of the Seller. 
DATED this /£»• day of September, 1986. 
IEL W. JACKSON 
AADL/mar 
-45-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / h d^"ay of Junef 1987, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the aforesaid Respondents' 
Brief to be peresonally delivered to the following: 
Daniel W. Jackson, Esq. 
The Walker Center, Suite 560 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
